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Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006)
Nicolas Hamann*
The Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP) provided public school
students with the option of transferring to either an eligible private school
or to another public school that met certain academic requirements.' If the
student chose a private school, the State would then issue a voucher for the
amount that it would have cost for the student to attend the former
public school.2 Along with other interested groups, parents of3
schoolchildren brought several constitutional challenges to the OSP.
Disagreeing with the Petitioners, a lower court declared the OSP
unconstitutional.4 However, a three-judge appellate panel reversed and
remanded.5 Following a subsequent order by the lower court declaring
the OSP unconstitutional,6 the appellate court issued an en banc decision
affirming the order.7 Since a district court of appeal had declared a state
statute unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of Florida obligatorily

* For my family, especially my father, Otto Hamann, whose inspiration led me to my
current path, and for Rashelle, whose strength came at critical times.
I. Bush v. Holmes (Holmes II1), 919 So. 2d 392, 397 (Fla. 2006). In order for the student
to transfer, the public school must receive a failing performance grade for at least half of a fouryear period, and the student must have attended the school for at least one year during the failing
period. See Law of May 16, 2002, ch. 2002-387, § 103, 2002 Fla. Laws ch. 387 (codified as
amended at FLA. STAT. § 1002.38 (2005), invalidated by Holmes III, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006).
The transferee public school must have a satisfactory performance grade to be eligible. Id.
§ 1002.38(1). Among other requirements, the transferee private school must be financially stable,
conform to accrediting body standards of curriculum, and employ teachers with at least a
baccalaureate degree, or a three-year minimum of "teaching experience in public or private
schools." Id. § 1002.38(4).
2. See id. § 1002.38(6)(a).
3. Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 398-99. The OSP was challenged under three sections of the
Florida Constitution: article I, § 3, article IX, § 1, and article IX, § 6. Id. at 399. Complaints were
also filed under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Id.
4. Id. The trial court found the program facially unconstitutional only under article IX, § 1
of the Florida Constitution. Id.
5. Bush v. Holmes (Holmes 1), 767 So. 2d 668, 675 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). On remand, the
plaintiffs dismissed challenges under the Establishment Clause and article IX, § 6. Id. at 399 & n. 1.
6. Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 399. "The trial court found that the OSP violated... article I,
section 3 ... "Id.
7. Id. at 399.
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reviewed the decision, 8 and HELD, that the OSP violated article IX, § 1 of
the Florida Constitution, because the OSP made public funds available to
private schools.9
Historically, Florida courts interpreted the Florida Constitution as
limiting legislative power.' ° In a facial constitutional challenge, courts
often employ maxims of statutory construction to determine whether
legislation falls within the bounds of the constitution." Though not always
used in constitutional interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius
is a principle of construction which provides that "'the expression of one
thing implies the exclusion of another."" 2 Consequently, courts have used
expressio unius to invalidate statutory enactments as beyond the limits
prescribed by the constitution. 3 However, as in Marasso v. Van Pelt,1"
courts sometimes use the maxim to restrict limitations that are merely

8. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
9. Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 398. Article IX, § 1 of the Florida Constitution states, in
relevant part:
The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of
Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision
for the education of all children residing within its borders. Adequate provision
shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system
of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education ....
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a).
10. CompareState v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 170 So. 602,606 (Fla. 1936) (stating that "[t]he
power of the Legislature is inherent, though it may be limited by the Constitution."), with Savage
v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 133 So. 341, 344 (Fla. 1931) (stating that the state constitution "is not
a grant of power to the Legislature but a limitation only upon legislative power").
11. See, e.g., Zingale v. Powell, 885 So. 2d 277, 282 (Fla. 2004) (following statutory
construction principles in interpreting the constitution); Caribbean Conservation Corp. v. Florida
Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm'n, 838 So. 2d 492, 501 (Fla. 2003) (using inparimateriato
determine whether a statute was constitutional); Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Millender, 666 So. 2d 882,
886 (Fla. 1996) (resorting to inpari materiain construing a constitutional amendment as a whole);
S & J Transp., Inc. v. Gordon, 176 So. 2d 69,71 (Fla. 1965) (applying expressio unius to determine
whether a statute was unconstitutional); Weinberger v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 112 So. 253, 256
(Fla. 1927) (applying expressio unius to interpret the constitutionality of a statute). But cf Forsythe
v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 454 (Fla. 1992) (explaining "that
where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous," then "judicial interpretation" is
inapplicable); A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1931) (stating that "[w]hen
the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning,
.
there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation .
12. Holmes II, 919 So. 2d at 407.
13. See S & J Transp., Inc., 176 So. 2d at 71-72 (using expressio unius to invalidate a statute
that was clearly contradicting a constitutional provision); Weinberger, 112 So. at 256-59 (applying
expressio unius to strike down a statute).
14. 81 So. 529 (Fla. 1919).
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implied by the language of the constitution. 5
In Marasso, the police arrested a man for possession of excessive
amounts of liquor. 6 At the time, the Florida Constitution expressly
prohibited the manufacture, sale, or trade of alcohol, but was silent on the
legality of possession. 7 The legal issue was the constitutionality of a
statute regulating alcohol possession. 8 As a foundation, the court stated
that expressio unius should never be used to defeat legislative intent. 9
Recognizing that the Florida Constitution gave the legislature permission
to "enact suitable laws" to enforce the constitutional provisions, 0 the court
stressed that a statute which "has a real relation to the subject and object"
of a constitutional provision is "suitable law."'" Furthermore, the court
rejected an application of expressio unius that would use constitutional
silence as the sole basis for implied limits on legislative power.22 Instead,
the court found that implied limits on legislative power may only be used
when absolutely necessary to implement an "express provision of the
constitution."23
Essentially, by requiring necessity, the court indirectly acknowledged
the notion that the Florida Constitution is a limitation, and not a grant, of
power.24 Since regulating alcohol possession not only effectuated the
general purpose of the constitutional provisions-to discourage alcohol
consumption-but actually promoted the specific express provisions,25 the
court held that the regulation was constitutional. 26 However, the Marasso
court did not determine the degree of clarity needed to find the necessity
required to impliedly limit legislative power.
Eight years later, the court further clarified the application of expressio
unius in the context of the school system in Weinbergerv. BoardofPublic
Instruction.2 7 The court considered whether the payment pattern of school
district bonds, which conformed to statutory mandates, was
constitutionally valid.28 The constitutional provision at issue required the

15. See id. at 530.
16. Id. at 529.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 530.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 532.
22. Id. at 530.
23. Id.
24. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
25. See Marasso,81 So. at 530 (discussing the article at issue's requirement that suitable laws
be enacted to enforce it).
26. Id. at 532.
27. 112 So. 253, 256-57 (Fla. 1927).
28. Id. at 254.
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school board to pay off the bonds according to a specific payment
schedule.29 However, a later statute authorized the school board, in its
discretion, to determine the manner in which the bonds became payable.3"
Using expressio unius, the court stressed "that where the Constitution
expressly provides the manner of doing a thing, it impliedly forbids its
being done in a substantially different manner."'" Recognizing that the
three-year payment periods that the school board approved were
incongruent with the constitutional schedule,32 the court prohibited the
legislature from allowing a discretionary payment pattern.33 In analyzing
whether the legislature acted contrary to an express limitation in the
constitution, the court provided several guidelines.34
The court delineated three instances signifying express contradictions
between statutes and constitutional provisions in an almost quantifiable
framework. 35 By emphasizing a numerical measure, the court refined
Marasso'sstandard of absolute necessity.36 According to the court, setting
a specific threshold value in the constitution-such as the amount of votes
necessary for authorization, the limit of debt incurred, or specific maturity
dates-was critical to indicating a clear contradiction when compared to
the legislative enactment.37 In other words, where the statute opposed these
clear quantifiable limits, there was a direct conflict rendering the statute
void.38 While the Weinberger court provided a means to analyze a conflict
between statutes and constitutional provisions, it did not provide guidance
for considering legislative purpose during the conflict analysis.
Marasso's refusal to apply expressio unius to nullify the statutory

29. Id.The Florida Constitution required that the bonds be paid annually after three years of
their initial issuance. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.at 256; see also infra note 51. Another interpretation of expressio unius is that 'very
nearly everything ...in a state constitution operates as a restriction on the legislature, for...
commands... directed to... government.., will operate to invalidate inconsistent legislation."'
Bush v. Holmes (Holmes I1), 886 So. 2d 340, 369 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (en banc), affd on other
grounds, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Frank P. Grad, The State Constitution:Its Function
and Formfor Our Time, 54 VA. L. REV. 928, 964-65 (1968)).
32. Weinberger, 112 So. at 254, 257.
33. Id.at 259.
34. Id.at 257.
35. See id.
36. See supranote 23 and accompanying text (explaining that only absolute necessity triggers
implied limits on legislative power).
37. The court drew a numerical nexus between the three examples, explaining that exceeding
"the debt limit," not obtaining "a two-thirds vote," or not setting a specific maturity date were all
similar since the illustrations clearly violated mandatory provisions. See Weinberger, 112 So. at
257.
38. See id.
at 259.
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objective raised questions that the court in Taylor v. Dorsey3 9 attempted to
resolve. In Taylor, a woman defaulted in paying her real estate broker.4"
The Florida Constitution stated that if a married woman bought or
improved her property, she could be liable for those actions in a court of
equity.4 The legislature, on the other hand, enacted a statute giving a
married woman the right to make contracts, and therefore be sued in a
court of law for any contractual dispute. " The question was whether the
statute was unconstitutional.43 The court said no." In analyzing whether
claims had to be of a particular kind and in a particular court to trigger
liability for a married woman, the court circumvented the Weinberger
approach by focusing on the general constitutional purpose, and not solely
on the specific provision.45
The court weighed two separate questions: whether the enactment's
purpose was to specifically enumerate grounds for liability, or whether the
constitution intended that the legislature act on specific matters. 46 The
court chose the latter, thereby freeing the legislature to advance the
constitutional objective by expanding the current list of permissible
action.47 Although the court failed to explicitly justify its interpretation, it
mentioned that it "should be liberal in its interpretation ...[and] every
doubt should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the law."48
Additionally, the court showed legislative deference by emphasizing that
expressio unius should not be used frequently.49
The majority in the instant case acknowledged legislative deference,
though merely as an introduction to its statutory construction analysis.5"
Instead, in striking down the OSP, it relied heavily on the Weinberger
decision, and emphasized that express provisions of the constitution must
be followed in the same way that they are prescribed, thus precluding
execution in a different manner.5 The majority then directed its attention
39. 19 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1944).
40. Id.at 877-80.
41. Id.at 880.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 882.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 881.
50. Holmes III, 919 So. 2d 392, 405 (Fla. 2006). The majority began by stating that statutes
are presumably constitutional. Id. However, after that statement, the majority abruptly concluded
that the OSP was unconstitutional, and began its constitutional analysis. See id.
51. Id.at 407. The majority focused on the following language:
Where the Constitution expressly provides the manner of doing a thing, it
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to the article IX, § 1 language,52 which in relevant part states that
"[a]dequate provision shall be made.., for a ...system of free public

schools."53 Without mentioning the stringent standard in Marasso,54 the
instant court determined that because § 1 specifically provides the manner
of fulfilling the educational obligation, a free education through private
schools conflicts with the express provisions of the constitution."
In concluding that the OSP directly conflicts with § 1, the majority
addressed the dissenters' application of Taylor. 6 Justice Bell, joined by
Justice Cantero, asserted that the purpose of§ 1 is to ensure that legislative
action is taken to provide for an adequate public school system, but not to
proscribe other methods of attaining adequate state-funded education.57
However, the majority disagreed, and concluded that § 1 encompasses
every state obligation concerning children's education."
The dissent criticized the majority's failure to distinguish Weinberger
from the instant case.59 Justice Bell argued that the provision in
Weinberger clearly prohibited any deviations from the payment schedule,
whereas § 1 provided no such clarity.6" Justice Bell further argued that
"[t]he OSP bears a real relation to the subject and object" of § 1;61thus,
under Marasso, it should be exempt from expressio unius scrutiny.
The instant court drastically minimized legislative discretion by
abandoning precedential guidelines. In particular, the majority failed to

impliedly forbids its being done in a substantially different manner. Even though
the Constitution does not in terms prohibit the doing of a thing in another manner,
the fact that it has prescribed the manner in which the thing shall be done is itself
a prohibition against a different manner of doing it. Therefore, when the
Constitution prescribes the manner of doing an act, the manner prescribed is
exclusive, and it is beyond the power of the Legislature to enact a statute that
would defeat the purpose of the constitutional provision.
Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 112 So. 253, 256 (Fla. 1927)).
52. Id.
53. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § l(a); see also supra note 9.
54. See supranote 23 and accompanying text (explaining that only absolute necessity triggers
implied limits on legislative power).
55. See Holmes II, 919 So. 2d at 408. The majority emphasized that any alternatives were
prohibited. Id.
56. Id.at 407-08.
57. Id.at 421 (Bell, J., dissenting).
58. See id.at 408 (majority opinion).
59. Id. at 421 (Bell, J., dissenting).
60. Id.The dissent distinguished Weinbergerby reasoning that expressio unius was used in
Weinberger "only because the constitution forbade any action other than that specified in the
constitution." Id.(quoting Bush v. Holmes (Holmes 1), 767 So. 2d 668, 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000),
rev'den banc, 886 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)).
61. See Holmes I1, 919 So. 2d at 421.
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acknowledge the factual presentations offered by Weinberger.62 Though
basing most of its reasoning on excerpts from that opinion, the majority
ignored Weinberger's quantifiable distinctions. Apparent in Weinberger
was the prerequisite of having a clear contradiction, perhaps a number
falling outside prescribed bounds, in order to apply expressio unius to
impliedly exclude a statutory provision.63 The instant case contained no
such numerical parallel. While taken cumulatively, Weinberger, Taylor,
and Marasso might not preclude using expressio unius solely because no
numerical base was present, the instant dissent's criticism of using the
maxim suggests a minimum requirement of extreme ambiguity.'
By avoiding the distinction between not clear and clearly contrary, the
majority raises the concern which Marasso attempted to resolve:
transforming a remote implication into an expressly conclusive limitation.
Without question, Weinberger naturally accommodated Marasso's
necessity theme by identifying a crystal-clear contradicting provision.
Other courts have also based the application of the clearly contrary
standard where the constitution specifically provides a list of an affected
class of individuals, or where it is explicitly stated that a certain number
of requirements must be met.66 However, the instant court subverts this
theme, not only because of the mere fact that disagreement among the
majority and dissent is indicative that the provision is not particularly
clear,67 but because a broad interpretation of implied limitations erodes the
function of the state constitution: to limit, not grant, legislative power.68
62. The majority used part of the law developed in Weinberger,but failed to mention any fact
whatsoever relevant to that decision. See id. at 407 (majority opinion).
63. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. Interestingly enough, the majority
acknowledged that the language of § 1 was not clear in order to resort to using maxims of statutory
construction. Holmes 111, 919 So. 2d at 408. The dissent argued that nothing in the provision
"requires that public schools be the sole means by which the State fulfills its duty," since § 1 does
not express "that the government's provision for education shall be 'by' or 'through' a system of
free public schools." Id. at 415-16 (Bell, J., dissenting).
65. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (discussing the provision involved in
Weinberger).
66. See, e.g., Sch. Bd. v. State, 353 So. 2d 834, 839 (Fla. 1977) (applying expressio unius
where the statute specifically enumerated certain individuals that would be affected by a uniform
salary requirement to prevent others from being affected); S & J Transp., Inc. v. Gordon, 176 So.
2d 69, 71-72 (Fla. 1965) (applying expressio unius to invalidate a statute which related only to
Dade County, since the constitutional provision specifically stated that the statute shall relate to
more than only Dade County); Chapman v. Reddick, 25 So. 673,676-77 (Fla. 1899) (rejecting the
application of expressio unius since it was not clearly contrary from the constitutional provision
whether particular persons would be subject to extraterritorial jurisdiction by certain courts).
67. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
68. It is useful to view the logic of this statement in three scenarios. If scenario 1 assumes
that the constitution functions as a grant of power, then logically the legislature has power to enact
only what is provided for in the constitution. Scenario 2 assumes that the constitution functions
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Logic dictates that if the constitution functioned as a power grant, then the
instant court would be correct in its analysis. Thus, solely not mentioning
private schools in the constitution would automatically proscribe any
legislation funding them. However, this is not the case, and as a result, a
sweeping application of expressiounius to curtail legislation by essentially
implying debatable conclusions is incompatible with Marasso and
Weinberger.
Furthermore, the instant court departs from Taylor by glossing over
Taylor's willingness to defer to the legislature whenever possible.69 Taylor
proposed two theories on interpreting the primary purpose of a
constitutional enactment: either to bring attention to the legislature on
specific matters, or to provide a comprehensive manner of resolving an
objective.7 ° That interpretive decision came with the primer of a
presumption of constitutionality in favor of the legislation." Indeed, the
instant court mentions legislative deference, but virtually ignores it.72
Instead, the instant court focuses on the breadth of the provision's
purpose rather than on the drafters' intent to provide a comprehensive
purely as a limitation on power, therefore the legislature has the power to enact laws, unless
prohibited by it. Scenario 3 results from the instant court decision: the constitution is essentially
functioning as a grant of power, because any enactment not covered in the constitution, whether
clear or not, is prohibited unless the court rules to permit it. Essentially, scenario 3 explains the
reasoning behind the following statement: "The Constitution of this State is not a grant of power
to the Legislature, but a limitation only upon legislative power, and unless legislation be clearly
contrary to some express or necessarily implied prohibition found in the Constitution, the courts
are without authority to declare legislative Acts invalid." Savage v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 133 So.
341, 344 (Fla. 1931).
69. See supranotes 48-49 and accompanying text. Taylor is one of many decisions affording
deference to the legislature. See, e.g., Caple v. Tuttle's Design-Build, Inc., 753 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla.
2000) (reaffirming that a statute should be construed as constitutional whenever possible and citing
VanBibbler v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Ins. Co., 439 So. 2d 880, 883 (Fla. 1983)); Coalition
for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400,408 (Fla. 1996) (holding
that the Florida Constitution gave the legislature "enormous discretion" to provide for an adequate
system of free public schools); State ex rel. Crim v. Juvenal, 159 So. 663, 664 (Fla. 1935)
(emphasizing that courts may "declare laws unconstitutional only as a matter of imperative and
unavoidable necessity. . . .") (emphasis added). In fact, lawmakers have relied on deference as a
norm. See, e.g., S.V. Date, Governor'sPower Can'tSave Vouchers, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 7,
2006, at A7 (illustrating how Governor Jeb Bush relied on "built-in deference" to push the OSP for
five years in spite of adverse court rulings).
70. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
71. See supranote 48 and accompanying text; see also State ex rel Moodie v. Bryan, 39 So.
929, 956 (Fla. 1905) (stating that expressio unius should be used with great care). Some courts have
even rejected the use of expressio unius altogether. See, e.g., Penrod v. Crowley, 356 P.2d 73, 80
(Idaho 1960) (stating that expressio unius does not apply when construing the state constitution);
Baker v. Martin, 410 S.E.2d 887,891 (N.C. 1991) (suggesting that the reason why expressio unius
has not been used in interpreting the state constitution is because it "flies directly in the face" of
the principle of legislative power).
72. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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manner of effectuating adequate education.73 The majority's methodology
supports the idea that by having a broad objective, the measures of
executing the constitutional provisions must be an all-inclusive set.74 Thus,
the majority's interpretation would lend to the conclusion that if the
purpose of a constitutional provision was to establish adequate healthcare,
for example, then that enactment would necessarily have to include every
manner of fulfilling that responsibility.75 Clearly then, the instant court has
placed legislative power at the mercy of a wide-ranging objective, thus
creating more statutory conflict.76
Moreover, the majority's decision disrupts the consistency towards
legislative deference in not only Taylor, but Marasso as well. In particular,
the court's exclusion of private schools cannot be squared with the
incredible legislative leeway evident in Marasso.77 In fact, a plausible fit
to the model developed by Marasso was demonstrated in the dissenting
opinion."
Most importantly, the instant court's approach has severe implications
for separation of powers.7 9 Clearly, a noticeable shift of power from the
73. See Holmes III, 919 So. 2d 392, 407-08 (Fla. 2006). The majority fails to support the
assertion that the intent of the drafters of the constitution was to provide for a "comprehensive
statement of the state's responsibilities." Id. at 408.
74. See id. at 407-08. In Taylor, the purpose of the provision was analyzed in concluding
whether expressio unius was applicable. See Taylor v. Dorsey, 19 So. 2d at 876, 882 (Fla. 1944).
The instant court never explicitly mentioned the drafters' intent. Therefore, one possible
explanation is that the majority inferred intent from applying expressiounius. But if that is the case,
then not only did the instant court employ the approach in Taylor backwards, but constructed a
method where a broad purpose is the only requirement to form a comprehensive set of
responsibilities.
75. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Moreover, this particular purpose would be
even more problematic, since technological advances would necessitate the constant updating of
manners of fulfilling adequate health.
76. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (explaining that a statute that "has a real
relation to the subject and object" of the constitutional provision is "suitable law").
78. The dissent asserted that the OSP bears a relationship to the objective of§ 1,since private
schools do not prevent the legislature from ensuring an adequate public school system. Holmes III,
919 So. 2d at 421 (Bell, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the intermediate appellate court's majority
panel opinion also justified advancing the objective of§ 1.See Holmes 1, 767 So. 2d 668, 676 (Fla.
I st DCA 2000), rev'den banc,886 So. 2d 340 (Fla. Ist DCA 2004) (recognizing that the legislature
sought to increase expectations and foster "competition among [public] schools" by allowing
private schools).
79. The instant court did not address the separation of powers doctrine, the idea behind which
is that "no branch may encroach upon the powers of another." See Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D,
E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1991). This same position on the role of the legislature was given
attention in major headlines. See, e.g., Sam Dillon, Florida Supreme Court Blocks School
Vouchers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2006, at Al 6 (quoting Governor Bush, who referred to the instant
decision as "'challeng[ing] the power of the Florida Legislature to decide as a matter of public
policy the best way to improve our educational system."'). Furthermore, the Supreme Court of
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legislature to the courts occurs by applying expressio unius in less than
exceptionally transparent circumstances.8" In so doing, a standard exposed
to ambiguity, at least in this context, has considerable potential for abuse,8 '
especially in a highly-politicized issue.82 In sum, even where judicial
minds differ, legislative discretion may be virtually non-existent because
of the capability of courts to materialize remote implications and turn them
into forceful limitations without even focusing on the substantive effect of
the original exclusion.83
Prior to the instant decision, a meaningful nexus, characterized by
unclouded necessity and a presumption of constitutionality, seemed to be
well-established. While subtle distinctions helped to guide the fragile
maxim's application, the instant decision ignores these, and instead marks
a victory for judicial supremacy by constructing a novel tool from bits and
pieces of a superficial overview of expressio unius. As a result, the
legislature is left with the support of the voters, but at the will of seven
individuals. Whether the new standard of employing expressio unius spurs
extreme judicial activism is an answer dependent on the future selfrestraint of the Florida courts. Until then, the maxim is certain to unveil
itself in partisan disputes, and the only remedy for enforcing the OSP will
be through a constitutional amendment.84

Florida has historically been a guardian of separation of powers. See State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d
345, 353 (Fla. 2000) ("This Court... in construing the Florida Constitution, has traditionally
applied a strict separation of powers doctrine.").
80. See supranotes 68, 76 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., John Tierney, Black Students Lose Again, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2006, at All
(quoting Clark Neily of the Institute for Justice as stating that "' [t]he judges decided what they
wanted to reach and worked backward from there').
82. See id (suggesting that Democrats in Florida are attempting to remove black students
from integrated schools). The author contends that the instant decision was a "politically creative
solution to a delicate problem." Id. Furthermore, he suggests that the instant decision was "legally
incoherent" given that "[t]he dissenters argue[d] persuasively that nothing in the Constitution
forbids the Legislature" from allowing a program outside of the public school system. Id.
83. Given that the instant court was dealing with a facial challenge, it stated that § 1 "does
not authorize additional equivalent alternatives" to public education before even analyzing whether
the OSP prevents public schools from attaining adequate education. Holmes 111, 919 So. 2d at 408
(majority opinion).
84. Governor Bush contended that the state will consider "amending the Florida
Constitution." Dillon, supra note 79, at A16; see also Date, supra note 69, at A7 (quoting Senate
President Tom Lee, who stated that although "[tjhe court ruling may not have left a lot of latitude,"
the Florida Senate may "attempt[] to amend [the constitution]").
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